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Introduction 
 
This report was prepared in response to a request for technical assistance from the Minnesota 
Pollution Control Agency (MPCA).  The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy supported the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) 
in its response to this request through the Technical Assistance Project.  
 
Discussion with Robert McCarron identified the following as the highest-priority questions: 
 
1. What is the effect of (i) size of Renewable Energy Reserve (RER) and (ii) duration of 
allocation award on (a) NOx emissions in Minnesota and (b) retail electricity prices? 
2. What data is available on the response of wind energy development to financial 
incentives? 
 
This report addresses these two questions below.  Appendix 1 provides sensitivity cases for 
question 1, above.  Appendix 2 provides data on wind energy resources in Minnesota.  Appendix 
3 provides the original Technical Assistance Project request.  
 
Effect of Size of Renewable Energy Reserve and Duration of 
Allocation Award 
 
We consider the following cases to explore the effect of size of RER and duration of allocation 
award: 
 
1. No reserve 
2. With reserves of the following size and duration: 
 
Size of Reserve → 
 
Duration of Award ↓
1% 10% 15%
5 years A   
10 years   C 
20 years  B  
 
For simplicity, we will present here only the RER design combination marked “C” in the table 
above, because this represents the current version of the MPCA proposal. We provide sensitivity 
analysis including combinations A and B in Appendix 1.  We will compare case C to a case 
without a reserve, for years after 2015. We focus on years after 2015 because the cap level 
decreases in that year. 
 
For each of these two cases, we will consider: 
 
1. How much value might be allocated, and how that value is distributed; 
2. Possible effect of that distribution on NOx emissions in Minnesota; 
3. Possible effect of that distribution on retail electricity price in Minnesota. 
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How much value is allocated under the different cases, and how is 
that value distributed? 
 
The size of the RER is a question of distribution of NOx allowances, a tradable commodity that 
will have value in the market that the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) establishes.  The duration 
of allocation award affects how this value will be considered from a project finance perspective – 
in other words, the risk associated with the value.  Table 1 shows distribution of the value in 
terms of the annual value, the total over the allocation period, and the net present value over the 
allocation period.  The net present value is calculated at two different discount rates and with and 
without prorating to reflect return on investment, regulatory risk, and prorating that is likely to 
occur if Minnesota meets its renewable energy goals. The prorating takes into account the fact 
that Minnesota’s renewable energy goals are higher than the size of the Renewable Energy 
Reserve. 
     
 
Table 1.  Value of Alternative Allowance Allocations in Minnesota 
 
Allowance Price $1000/ ton-yr $2000/ton-yr 
  
No Reserve C. 15%,  
    10 years 
No Reserve C. 15%,  
     10 years 
Annual Value to Fossil 
Generators $26,203,000 $22,272,550 $52,406,000  $44,545,100 
Annual Value to Renewable 
Generators $0 $3,930,450 $0  $7,860,900 
Total Over Allocation Period 
to Renewable Generators $0 $39,304,500 $0  $78,609,000 
Net Present Value to 
Renewable Generators Over 
Allocation Period          
10% discount rate $0 $26,566,005 $0  $53,132,010 
30% discount rate $0 $15,796,484 $0  $31,592,968 
10% discount rate, 0.3 
prorate $0 $7,969,802 $0  $15,939,603 
30% discount rate, 0.3 
prorate $0 $4,738,945 $0  $9,477,890 
 
What is the effect of this distribution of allowance value on NOx 
emissions in Minnesota? 
 
With a cap-and-trade system, total emissions from regulated sources are expected to be equal to 
the cap, unless allowances are retired.  This remains the case with an RER.  The effect of a 
Minnesota RER on emissions that occur in Minnesota, a small part of the CAIR region, is 
difficult to predict because of uncertainty about allowance market performance.  Allowance 
market performance is independent of the RER. We consider the expected effect of the RER 
under two scenarios:  “competitive allowance market performance” and “constrained allowance 
market performance.”  We do not speculate as to which of these scenarios may better predict 
market performance.     
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Under a scenario of competitive allowance market performance, the RER would not affect fossil 
generators’ decisions about control equipment purchases or generation. Economic theory of 
competitive markets suggests that initial allocation of a good, in this case allowances, would not 
affect the price or allocation of the good once equilibrium is achieved through trade. In order for 
theory to hold true in actual markets, a market does not necessarily have to meet all of criteria for 
a “perfect” market in the economic sense, but deviations from perfect markets interject the 
possibility that actual market performance would not follow theoretical performance, as explored 
in the “constrained allowance market performance” scenario.     
 
Under a scenario of constrained allowance market performance, market imperfections would 
cause the fossil generators to assume a substantially lower cost of achieving emissions 
compliance by retiring allowances that were allocated directly to them, as compared to 
allowances that they could purchase in the market. Examples of such market imperfections 
include effects of regulations, monopolies, liquidity problems, or transaction costs. With 
sufficiently large market imperfections, fossil generators might avoid purchasing the incremental 
allowances that they would need because of the RER. They could avoid these purchases by 
installing more control equipment or by generating less electricity.  
 
Modeling has not been performed to evaluate a Minnesota RER, but some of the analysis of 
CAIR using computer modeling provides possible indicators of how Minnesota generators might 
respond to an RER under the scenario of constrained allowance market performance.  This 
modeling was performed for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) using the IPM™ 
model, and the description of the model, modeling assumptions, and modeling results are 
available.1  Some modeling results show how generators are likely to respond to slightly higher 
marginal cost of control, higher electricity demand, and higher natural gas prices (CAIR 2004 
EIA case vs. CAIR 2004 Analysis case).  With a $100 (6%) increase in marginal cost of control 
from $1,600 to $1,700, emissions rates (lbs/Mbtu) of Minnesota generation do not change.  This 
would suggest that Minnesota generators are unlikely to change how much control equipment 
they install in response to an RER, even with constrained allowance market performance. 
 
However, one coal-fired2 unscrubbed plant appears to reduce its emissions by about 10%, from 
518 tons to 467 tons, because it generates less.  These modeling runs suggest an overall 100 ton 
decrease in NOx emissions in Minnesota, (or 0.4% of the Minnesota allowances), due entirely to 
changes in generation in response to the higher marginal cost of control, higher electricity 
demand, and higher natural gas price.  Therefore, these modeling runs suggest that increased 
marginal cost of control would have little effect on generator behavior; and, if anything, would 
cause them to generate slightly less under a scenario of constrained allowance market 
performance.   
 
It should be noted that these modeling runs cannot provide insight on the relative competitive 
position of Minnesota generators in comparison to those of other states, nor do they offer insight 
as to whether the scenario of constrained allowance market performance is likely.  If Minnesota 
generators became less competitive relative to those in other states because of the RER, then NOx 
emissions in Minnesota would be expected to decrease due to lower generation.  The unscrubbed 
                                                 
1 Multi-Pollutant Analyses and Technical Support Documents, Power Sector Modeling Supporting 
Materials,  http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/mp/index.html. 
2 These modeling runs do not offer a good comparison to assess gas-fueled generation behavior, because 
they do not isolate the effect of cost of control from the effect of higher natural gas prices. 
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coal plant affected by a higher marginal cost of control in the CAIR modeling runs might reduce 
its generation even more.    
 
A Minnesota RER is not likely to cause an overall change in the NOx allowance price in the 
CAIR region.  EPA published a marginal abatement cost curve3  that shows the marginal 
abatement cost versus the amount of emissions reduction. Using the slope of this curve, one can 
estimate that even retirement of the entire 2,620 allowances in a 10% RER would increase the 
marginal cost of NOx emissions control by only $2/ton. Retirement of the entire RER is 
unlikely,4 but represents a maximum scenario for its effect on the NOx emissions allowance 
market. 
 
What is the effect of this distribution of allowance value on retail 
electricity price in Minnesota? 
 
A simple estimate of the maximum5 effect of the RER on retail electricity price in Minnesota 
may be made using the following assumptio 6ns:  
1.  Annual fossil generation will not be affected by the RER. (This is likely to be a slight 
overestimate, because we would expect the RER to cause a slight increase in renewable 
generation, as discussed in the next section, “Response of Wind Energy Development to 
Financial Incentives.”)   
2.  The market price of allowances will not be affected by the RER.7  
3.  All additional costs to fossil generators will be passed on to the consumer. (This would 
actually depend on the regulator.) 
 
Based on these assumptions, an estimate of the maximum effect of the RER on retail electricity 
prices is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Approximate Maximal Effect of RER on Retail Electricity Price in Minnesota 
 
Allowance Price $1,000/ ton-yr $2,000/ton-yr 
  
No Reserve C. 15%,  
     10 years 
No Reserve C. 15%,  
     10 years 
Annual Value to Fossil 
Generators $26,203,000 $22,272,550 $52,406,000  $44,545,100 
Incremental Cost Due to RER $0 $3,930,450 $0  $7,860,900 
Annual Generation (GWh) 54,000 54,000 54,000  54,000 
Incremental Cost (cents/kWh) 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000  0.0146 
                                                 
3 Federal Register, Volume 70, p. 25211. 
4 A RER does not retire allowances.  However, allowances allocated to renewable generation might be 
retired under certain circumstances.  Please see “Incorporating Wind Generation in Cap and Trade 
Programs,” p. 12. http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy06osti/40006.pdf 
5 This is not a comprehensive assessment of all possible effects, ONLY a simple approach to estimating a 
maximum effect. 
6 Modeled effects of CAIR on retail electricity prices are shown in table D-8 of the Regulatory Impact 
Analysis for Final Clean Air Interstate Rule.  This suggests a 2020 retail electricity price increase of 0.8% 
could be anticipated to result from implementation of CAIR. http://www.epa.gov/cair/technical.html 
7 This could be an overestimate if net fossil generation in the CAIR region decreased due to the RER 
(lowering demand for allowances), or an underestimate due to market imperfections or if retirement of 
RER allowances occurred. 
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Response of Wind Energy Development to Financial Incentives  
 
Based on discussions with MPCA, we determined that it would be useful to provide data that 
shows that wind energy development increases in response to increased financial incentives, and 
that shows the possible magnitude of the response.  A full analysis of the expected response of 
wind energy development in Minnesota to financial incentives is beyond the scope of this report.  
Instead, we recommend for MPCA consideration: 
1. Western Governors’ Association, Clean and Diversified Energy Initiative, Wind Task 
Force Report,8 shows that wind energy development has been highly sensitive to the 
federal production tax credit.  This suggests that wind energy development responds to 
financial incentives, albeit one that is larger than the incentive likely to be provided by 
the RER. 
2. Wind Energy Cost Curves.  A description of these cost curves is provided in the same 
report.9  Similar data for Minnesota is available.10  
 
8 Page 41, http://www.westgov.org/wga/initiatives/cdeac/Wind-full.pdf 
9 Page 17, http://www.westgov.org/wga/initiatives/cdeac/Wind-full.pdf 
10 Please see spreadsheet included as Appendix 2 with this report. 
Appendix 1. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Table 1. Additional Sensitivity Analysis, Value of Alternative Allowance Allocations in Minnesota 
 
Allowance Price $1,000/ ton-yr $2,000/ton-yr $3,000/ton-yr 
  
No 
Reserve 
A. 1%,  
     5 years 
B. 10%,  
   20 years 
C. 15%,  
   10 years 
No 
Reserve 
A. 1%,  
     5 years 
B. 10%,  
    20 years 
C. 15%,  
   10 years 
No 
Reserve 
A. 1%,  
     5 years 
B. 10%,  
    20 years 
C. 15%,  
    10 years 
Annual Value to Fossil 
Generators $26,203,000  $25,940,970 $23,582,700 $22,272,550 $52,406,000 $51,881,940 $47,165,400 $44,545,100 $78,609,000 $77,822,910 $70,748,100 $66,817,650  
Annual Value to Renewable 
Generators $0  $262,030 $2,620,300 $3,930,450 $0 $524,060 $5,240,600 $7,860,900 $0 $786,090 $7,860,900 $11,791,350  
Total Over Allocation 
Period to Renewable 
Generators $0  $1,310,150 $52,406,000 $39,304,500 $0 $2,620,300 $104,812,000 $78,609,000 $0 $3,930,450 $157,218,000 $117,913,500  
Net Present Value to 
Renewable Generators 
Over Allocation Period                   
10% discount rate $0  $1,092,630 $24,538,900 $26,566,005 $0 $2,185,260 $49,077,800 $53,132,010 $0 $3,277,890 $73,616,700 $79,698,015  
30% discount rate $0  $829,650 $11,294,888 $15,796,484 $0 $1,659,300 $22,589,775 $31,592,968 $0 $2,488,950 $33,884,663 $47,389,452  
10% discount rate, 0.3 
prorate $0  $327,789 $7,361,670 $7,969,802 $0 $655,578 $14,723,340 $15,939,603 $0 $983,367 $22,085,010 $23,909,405  
30% discount rate, 0.3 
prorate $0  $248,895 $3,388,466 $4,738,945 $0 $497,790 $6,776,933 $9,477,890 $0 $746,685 $10,165,399 $14,216,835  
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7Table 2. Additional Sensitivity Analysis, Approximate Maximal Effect of RER on Retail Electricity Price in 
Minnesota 
 
Allowance Price   $1,000/ ton-yr   $2,000/ton-yr $3,000/ton-yr 
  
No 
Reserve 
A. 1%, 5 
years 
B. 10%, 20 
years 
C. 15%, 10 
years 
No 
Reserve 
A. 1%, 5 
years 
B. 10%, 20 
years 
C. 15%, 10 
years 
No 
Reserve 
A. 1%, 5 
years 
B. 10%, 20 
years 
C. 15%, 10 
years 
Annual Value to Fossil 
Generators $26,203,000  $25,940,970 $23,582,700 $22,272,550 $52,406,000 $51,881,940 $47,165,400 $44,545,100 $78,609,000 $77,822,910 $70,748,100 $66,817,650  
Incremental Cost Due to 
RER $0  $262,030 $2,620,300 $3,930,450 $0 $524,060 $5,240,600 $7,860,900 $0 $786,090 $7,860,900 $11,791,350  
Annual Generation (GWh) 54,000  54,000 54,000 54,000 54,000 54,000 54,000 54,000 54,000 54,000 54,000 54,000  
Incremental Cost 
(cents/kWh) 0.0000  0.0005 0.0049 0.0073 0.0000 0.0010 0.0097 0.0146 0.0000 0.0015 0.0146 0.0218  
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Appendix 2.  Description of Wind Energy Data Workbook11 
 
Please refer to the wind energy data workbook provided with this report.  The following is a 
description of the data. 
 
The workbook contains the raw data for Minnesota that could be used to construct the supply 
curves similar to the ones that are displayed in the Western Governors’ Association, Clean and 
Diversified Energy Initiative, Wind Task Force Report.12 Please note: 
1. Each worksheet starts with land area grouped in bins by wind resource class (from class 7 
to class 3) and cost per MWh of producing electricity.  Then, starting at row 250, you will 
see the corresponding MW capacity that could be constructed, also grouped by resource 
class and cost per MWh.  You may find the MW capacity data more useful, so I have 
highlighted for MN. MN has usable class 4 and 5 wind.  I did not see any class 3 or class 
7. 
2. Each worksheet represents a different assumption about transmission availability, ranging 
from 0 to 40% of current transmission capacity.  The effect of transmission availability 
on amount of wind energy available in each resource/cost bin may be seen by comparing 
the different worksheets.  This comparison will be most informative if supply curves are 
constructed from the data. 
3. The final worksheet provides details of land-exclusion assumptions and data sources. 
Note that this is based on older, lower-resolution, NREL-validated Minnesota wind data, 
not on the newer, higher-resolution data that has not been validated by NREL. 
4. Cost assumptions appear at the top of each spreadsheet.  As you can see, there is one base 
production cost (levelized cost of energy - LCOE) for each wind resource class, and then 
one transmission cost per MWh-mile.  The cost shown in $1 increment bins represents 
the cost of production (LCOE), plus the cost of constructing the transmission that would 
be needed to connect to the grid.  It is the distance to transmission that causes the cost to 
be spread over a number of bins within each class.  The value in each cell represents the 
amount (land area or MW) of wind resource (by class) available at that total cost 
($/MWh, production + transmission).  
5. The MN resource is in MN (within the capability of the Geographic Information System 
to determine), but it could be used in other states.  It would require additional analysis to 
restrict it to the resource that could be used in MN.  
6. The load assigned to wind (20% of city peak demand) is the same in each of the 
worksheets. 
7. To construct a total supply curve from one of the worksheets, the total amount of MW 
available at each cost would be summed across all resources.  The difference among 
supply curves from different worksheets will show the effect of different transmission 
availability assumptions. 
 
 
 
11 This appendix describes a data workbook that was e-mailed to Robert McCarron as part of the Technical 
Assistance Project. Wind resource data is available at http://www.nrel.gov/wind/resource_assessment.html,  
12 Page 17, http://www.westgov.org/wga/initiatives/cdeac/Wind-full.pdf 
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Appendix 3. Original Request – Technical Assistance Project 
Checklist for Request 
 
The TAP program is designed to help states and cities in crosscutting areas not currently covered by an 
existing DOE program.  The project has defined five areas as examples of appropriate requests:  
 
• System benefit charges or other rate-payer funded utility efficiency and renewable programs; 
• Renewable or efficiency portfolio standards; 
• Use of clean energy technologies to help states and localities address air emissions;  
• Use of renewable energy on public lands (state and local); or 
• Use of renewable and energy efficiency technologies for state and local disaster relief, mitigation and 
planning. 
 
The TAP team considers and approves other requests beyond these areas if they meet the intent of 
the project.   
 
 DATE REQUEST SUBMITTED TO REGIONAL OFFICE 
      
 February 22, 2006 
 
 CITY/STATE 
 
 Minnesota 
 
 ORGANIZATION(S) REQUESTING ASSISTANCE 
 
 Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) 
 
 POINT OF CONTACT 
 
Who is the primary point of contact?  
(Name, phone number and email address) 
 
 Robert McCarron, (651) 296-7324, robert.mccarron@pca.state.mn.us  
 
Are there other contacts?  
(Name(s) phone number(s) and e-mail address(es) 
 
 Mary Jean Fenske, (651) 297-5472, maryjean.fenske@pca.state.mn.us   
 John Seltz, (651) 296-7801, john.seltz@state.mn.us  
 
Which agencies are involved? 
 
 Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 
 
Is the State Energy Office (SEO) involved? 
 
  We are consulting with Minnesota’s Department of Commerce. 
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 TYPE OF ASSISTANCE & ESTIMATED LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE 
REQUESTED 
 
__X__  Consultation 
_____ Phone  
_____ Email 
_____ On-site visit 
__X__ Other (Specify) 
 
Written reports that describe findings and cite references. 
 
 _____  Presentation 
 
 _____  Testimony 
 
 _____  Review of legislation and/or documentation 
 
 _____ Uncertain what type of assistance is required. 
 
 _____ Other (Specify) 
 
 LAB & TECHNICAL PERSONNEL 
 
 Is there a request for a specific person and/or lab?  No. 
 
 PROJECT ASSISTANCE SUMMARY 
 
As the MPCA plans to implement USEPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), questions 
arise with respect to the operations of renewable energy reserves – sometimes known as “set-
asides.”  These are measures that reserve a fixed number of NOx trading program allowances 
for distribution to generators that use renewable energy.  NOx trading is new to Minnesota 
and we would like assistance in these areas (listed in order of priority): 
 
1. Size of Renewable Energy Reserve 
We would like to know how renewable energy reserves of 1%, 3%, 5% and 10% affect: 
• NOx emissions in Minnesota 
• administrative costs of the renewable energy reserve to grantees and to state agencies 
• retail electricity prices 
• costs incurred by emission source operators who “lose” allowances to renewable 
energy generators 
• financial benefit to grantees 
 
2. Duration of Allocation Award 
We would like to know how the length of time an allowance is awarded (1, 5, 10 or 20 years) 
affects: 
• NOx emissions in Minnesota 
• administrative costs of the renewable energy reserve to grantees and to state agencies 
• retail electricity prices 
• costs incurred by emission source operators who “lose” allowances to renewable 
energy generators 
• financial benefit to grantees 
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3.  Interaction with Renewable Energy Credits Programs 
 
Questions have arisen on the interaction of renewable energy reserves with other energy 
programs.  We need to further understand how or whether renewable energy reserves impact 
the value of Renewable Energy Credits.  If NREL has or can compile information related to 
this issue, it would advance the decision process in Minnesota.   
 
4. Evaluation of Renewable Energy Reserve Programs in Other States 
We would like to learn all that we can from other states’ experiences.  We have yet to find 
program evaluations for renewable energy reserves in other states.  If they exist, we would 
like to review them. 
 
 WHAT ARE THE LONG TERM GOALS OF THIS PROJECT? 
 
Stable and meaningful incentives that will encourage development of renewable energy 
resources. 
 
 ELIGIBILITY FOR TAP 
 
How does this request relate to one of the designated topics? Does it go beyond the scope of these 
projects? 
 
We expect that information developed by this project will help promote the “use of clean energy 
technologies to help states and localities address air emissions.” 
 
 TIMING 
 
What is the time schedule on this request? 
 
Information will be most helpful if it is received by the end of March. 
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